Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy by Javier Díaz-Giménez et al.
Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy∗
Javier D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez Giorgia Giovannetti Ramon Marimon
Pedro Teles†
This version: January 11, 2006
Abstract
We study the eﬀects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of mone-
tary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unantici-
pated inﬂation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated
inﬂation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal
sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until
these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary
policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time
inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative
forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commitment to ﬁscal
policy. Full commitment for the ﬁscal authority can override any commitment
problem of the monetary authority.
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and CEPR.1 Introduction
Fiscal discipline has often been seen as a precondition to sustain price stability. Such is,
for example, the rationale behind the Growth and Stability Pact in Europe. The policy
discussion seems to be fueled by the awareness of a time inconsistency problem likely
to be associated with high levels of nominal debt. While this discussion is certainly
worth undertaking, it is usually misguided by insuﬃcient theoretical discipline. In this
paper we analyze the implications of nominal debt for optimal sequential policy, using
as framework a very simple model but still one that provides powerful insights into
optimal dynamic monetary policy and accumulation of debt in environments without
commitment.
We show how optimal monetary policy diﬀers depending on whether there is nominal
or indexed debt and on the degree of commitment of monetary authorities. Because
debt is nominal there is an ex-post incentive to deplete it, so that future distortionary
taxes may be lower. There is also a cost. Agents must use money balances that are
predetermined and therefore a depletion of the real value of nominal debt also means
lower real balances and therefore lower consumption. This incentive to deplete the real
value of debt depends on the level of debt. It is a feature of optimal policy in an
equilibrium without commitment that the amount of debt is reduced to the point where
those incentives disappear. Rational governments, even when noncommitted, optimally
manipulate the incentives of future governments by choosing the level of debt as the
state variable for the optimal choice of their successors.
We start by computing the optimal policy that obtains when the stock of debt is
nominal and there is full commitment to monetary policy. We show that, in this case,
it is optimal to monetize part of the initial stock of nominal debt. Consumption is
constant from the second period onwards, and in the initial period it is lower. This
incentive to deplete the real value of nominal debt is present every period if there is no
commitment.
We proceed to study optimal policy in an environment where the stock of debt is
nominal and there is no commitment to monetary policy. We restrict attention to the
Markov perfect equilibrium. We call this equilibrium recursive as in Cole and Kehoe
(1996), and in Obstfeld (1997). Two interesting features of the optimal policy that
obtains in this economy are that the optimal inﬂation tax is non-stationary, and that it
converges to the inﬂation tax that obtains when there is no government debt. This last
result arises because, in the recursive equilibrium, it is optimal for the government to
reduce the value of the stock of nominal government debt until it is asymptotically zero.
We show that nominal debt is indeed a burden for monetary policy not only because it
has to be serviced, but also because of the dynamic distortion associated with the time
inconsistency. Not surprisingly, when the initial nominal liabilities are the same, welfare
under full commitment is higher than welfare under no commitment.
As a benchmark we characterize the optimal policy that obtains when the stock of
1government debt is indexed. Our results build on those of Nicolini (1998), who shows
that, when the utility function is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure, and
the stock of government debt is indexed, the optimal monetary policy is to abstain
from inﬂation surprises. This result follows from applying optimal taxation principles,
and it means that the solution to the Ramsey problem is time consistent in this model
economy. Furthermore, this solution is also stationary, and there is a unique interest
rate that balances the government budget.
We proceed to compare the equilibrium allocations in the two economies without
commitment, with and without indexed debt. We discuss in detail how to make the
welfare comparisons meaningful, taking into account that in the nominal economies the
initial conditions are in nominal terms and that in the indexed economy the initial
condition for debt is in real terms.
We ﬁnally ask whether the results are robust to the introduction of additional taxes.
This is important since, in advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source of tax
revenues, and we want to know if our results still hold when government outlays are
ﬁnanced with other taxes. Speciﬁcally, we study the case of consumption taxes. First,
we impose the natural assumption that taxes are chosen before the monetary policy
decisions are made. In particular they are assumed to be chosen one period in advance.
We ﬁnd that the same equilibria result when there are both seigniorage and consumption
taxes than when there is only seigniorage, provided that the optimal monetary policy
distortions can be supported with strictly positive nominal interest rates.
When, instead, there is enough ﬁscal commitment, the ﬁscal authority can constrain
the monetary authority to follow the Friedman rule, of zero nominal rates, from the
outset. In this case, since negative interest rates cannot be sustained in equilibrium, the
monetary authority has no incentive to monetize the debt and, as a result, it implements
the optimal equilibrium with commitment.1
The relationship between ﬁscal and monetary policy has been addressed in the un-
pleasant monetarist arithmetic literature of Sargent and Wallace (1981), and in the ﬁscal
theory of the price level of Sims (1994) and Woodford (1996). In these approaches, how-
ever, policies are taken to be exogenous. This is not the case in our analysis, nor in
the related work of Chari and Kehoe (1999), Ellison and Rankin (2005), and Obstfeld
(1997). These last two papers are the closest to ours. Both, however, assume that
debt is real, and they focus only on monetary policy. They aim at characterizing the
Markov perfect equilibrium when the source of the time inconsistency of monetary pol-
icy is related to the depletion of the real value of money balances. This source of time
inconsistency is ambiguous: while in Lucas and Stokey (1983) the government would
want to completely deplete the outstanding money balances, in Svensson (1985)’s set
up, as was shown in Nicolini (1998), under certain elasticity conditions, the government
problem would be time consistent. This ambiguity led Obstfeld (1997) to consider an
ad-hoc cost of a surprise inﬂation. Our analysis diﬀers from Obstfeld’s both because we
consider nominal debt, and because, in our model economy, the cost of unanticipated
1See also Marimon, Nicolini and Teles, 2003.
2inﬂation arises from the timing of the cash-in-advance constraint, rather than being
imposed ad-hoc. In a similar framework, Ellison and Rankin (2005) show that with
alternative preferences to the ones in Nicolini (1998) the level of real debt matters for
the direction of the time inconsistency problem. They show that there can be a value
of real debt such that the elasticity is unitary and, therefore, there exists a steady state
with positive debt.
An additional contribution of this paper is the full characterization and the com-
putation of the optimal policy in a recursive equilibrium with a state variable. In this
respect, our work is closely related to the recent work of Krusell, Mart´ ın and R´ ıos-Rull
(2003) who characterize the recursive equilibria that obtain in an optimal labor taxation
problem.
2 The model economy
In our model economy there is a representative household and a government. In each
period t ≥ 0, the government issues currency M
g
t+1 and nominal debt B
g
t+1, to ﬁnance
an exogenous and constant level of public consumption g.2 Initially, we abstract from










t(1 + it) + ptg, t ≥ 0 (1)
where it is the nominal interest rate paid on debt issued by the government at time
t − 1, and pt is the price of one unit of the date t composite good in units of money.
The initial stock of currency, M
g
0, and initial debt liabilities, B
g
0(1 + i0), are given. A




t+1,g} for t ≥ 0.
We assume that the household’s preferences over consumption and labor can be




t[u(ct) − αnt] (2)
where ct > 0 denotes consumption at time t, nt denotes labor at time t, and 0 < β < 1
is the time discount factor. We assume that the utility of consumption satisﬁes the
standard assumptions of being strictly increasing and strictly concave. For reasons that
will become clear below, in most of this article we assume that the utility is logarithmic
in consumption, i.e., u(c) = log(c).
We assume that consumption in period t must be purchased using currency car-
ried over from period t − 1 as in Svensson (1985). This timing of the cash-in-advance
2We assume that government expenditures, g, are given, although our analysis can easily be extended
to the case of endogenous government expenditures.
3constraint implies that the representative household takes both M0 and B0(1 + i0) as
given when solving its maximization problem, and it is crucial to obtain the results
that we report here. The speciﬁc form of the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the
representative household is:
ptct ≤ Mt (3)
for every t ≥ 0.
To simplify the production side of this economy, we assume that labor can be trans-
formed into either the private consumption good or the public consumption good on a
one-to-one basis. The economy’s resource constraint is:
ct + g ≤ nt (4)
for every t ≥ 0.
Each period the representative household faces the following budget constraint:
Mt+1 + Bt+1 ≤ Mt − ptct + Bt(1 + it) + ptnt (5)
where Mt+1 and Bt+1 denote, respectively, the stock of money and the stock of nominal
government debt that the household carries over from period t to period t + 1. Finally,







2.1 A competitive equilibrium






t=0, an allocation {Mt+1,Bt+1,ct,nt}∞







0(1 + i0), the government policy and the price vector satisfy the
government budget constraints described in expression (1);
(ii) when households take M0, B0(1 + i0) and the price vector as given, the allocation
maximizes the problem described in expression (2), subject to the cash-in-advance
constraints described in expression (3), the household budget constraints described
in expression (5), and the no-Ponzi games condition described in expression (6);
and
(iii) all markets clear, that is: M
g
t+1 = Mt+1, B
g
t+1 = Bt+1, and g and {ct,nt}∞
t=0 satisfy
the economy’s resource constraint described in expression (4), for every t ≥ 0.
4Given our assumptions on the utility of consumption u, it is straightforward to show
that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy satisﬁes both the economy’s
resource constraint (4) and the household’s budget constraint (5) with equality, and
that the ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian of the household’s problem are both
necessary and suﬃcient to characterize the solution to the household’s problem. The
cash in advance constraint, (3), will be binding in every period t ≥ 0 if
u0(ct)
α > 1. Since
u0(ct+1)
α = 1+it+1, t ≥ 0, this will be the case whenever it+1 > 0. In period zero the cash
in advance constraint will be binding whenever c0 ≤ ct+1, t ≥ 0. This will be a feature
of the equilibria that we characterize.
The competitive equilibrium allocation of an economy with nominal debt can be
completely characterized by the following conditions that must hold for every t ≥ 0:
u0(ct+1)
α
= 1 + it+1, (7)




















When choosing its policy the government takes into account the above equilibrium
conditions. These conditions can be summarized with implementability conditions in
terms of the real allocations. In particular, the government budget constraint (1 ) with































































































− (ct + g)

= z0c0 (12)








− g − ct

= z0c0 (13)




3 Optimal policy with nominal debt
3.1 The case with full commitment
We start the analysis by studying the optimal monetary policy that obtains when the
stock of government debt is nominal and the government can fully commit. When debt
is not indexed a higher initial price level depletes the real value of both money balances
and debt, which is a seigniorage tax at t = 0 that can be levied without aﬀecting the
commitment to future interest rates. The fact that consumption must be purchased with
currency carried over from the previous period means that there is a cost in reducing
the real value of money balances. Even if this cost is present, there may be an incentive
for a Ramsey government to increase the initial seigniorage tax at t = 0, and to use its
proceeds to reduce the need for future distortionary taxation.
Deﬁnition 2 A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt is a





t [u(ct) − α(ct + g)] (14)
subject to the implementability condition (12).






t=0, the allocation {Mt+1,Bt+1,nt}∞
t=0, and the price vector, {pt,it+1}∞
t=0, are
obtained using the competitive equilibrium conditions.
In the log case where u(ct) = ln(ct), the full commitment Ramsey equilibrium is











[1 + z0] (15)
ct+1 = c
F
1 , for t ≥ 1. (16)
Notice that, as long as z0 > 0, cF
0 is smaller than cF
1 . The initial outstanding
nominal debt is depleted at the expense of a lower real stock of money, and, therefore,
lower consumption.
3.2 Optimal policy with nominal debt and no commitment
When the government cannot commit to its monetary policy, the incentive to monetize
part of the debt discussed in the previous section arises every period. In other words,
the special features of ‘period zero’ in the full commitment economy with nominal debt
become the recurrent features of the economy without commitment.
In each period t ≥ 0, the government chooses ct and is not able to commit. We
look at Markov perfect equilibria where ct does not depend on the whole history up
to period t but may only depend on the pay-oﬀ relevant state variable zt. That is,
the government policy is a function C such that the consumption path is sequentially
deﬁned by ct = C(zt).
Deﬁnition 3 A recursive monetary equilibrium with nominal debt is a value func-
tion V(z) and policy functions C(z) and Z(z) such that c = C(z) and z0 = Z(z) solve
V (z) = max
{c,z0}











0) = zc + c (18)
The recursive equilibrium can be obtained by solving the following dynamic pro-
gramming problem








0) = c(1 + z) (20)
for an arbitrary function C. As a solution to this problem there is an optimal policy C =
F(C), where F maps the –exogenously given– functions into optimal policy functions.
A recursive equilibrium is then a ﬁxed point C = F(C).
In the log case, this simpliﬁes to ﬁnding a function C that is the optimal policy to
the problem





− g + βz
0C(z
0) = c(1 + z) (22)
To characterize the recursive monetary equilibrium, notice that the ﬁrst order con-
ditions of the problem described in expressions (21) and ( 22) are
1
c



















This condition equates the ‘reduced’ marginal gain of one additional unit of con-
sumption to its ‘ampliﬁed’ marginal cost associated with higher debt needed to ﬁnance
this consumption. The gain is ‘reduced’, by the factor 1 + z, since increasing consump-
tion, by decreasing the current price level, increases the real value of the outstanding
stock of debt. Alternatively, lowering consumption, with an increase in the current price
level, has the beneﬁt of partially monetizing the current stock of debt. The cost of the
debt is ‘ampliﬁed’ since increasing the stock of debt makes future consumption more
costly by facing the trade-oﬀ of monetizing a higher stock of debt. Notice that the ﬁrst
distortion (‘reduction’) is a price level eﬀect, already present in the period zero of the
8Ramsey equilibrium (15), while the second distortion (‘ampliﬁcation’) is an interest rate
eﬀect, not present in the Ramsey equilibrium, reﬂecting the intertemporal distortions
that appear along a recursive equilibrium path when nominal debts can be sequentially
monetized.












1 + z0 [1 + εc(z
0)]
−1 (26)






















This intertemporal equation reﬂects the diﬀerent distortions present as a result of
debt being nominal and policy decisions being sequential. In the next section we solve













are not present in the corresponding intertemporal condition. Neither
the discretionary incentive to reduce the real value of debt, nor the dynamic eﬀect on
these incentives associated with the accumulation of debt are there if debt is indexed.
The recursive equilibrium is less eﬃcient than the full commitment Ramsey equilib-
rium. The full commitment Ramsey solution is the choice of a sequence of consumption
{ct}
∞
t=0 that maximizes welfare in the set of competitive equilibrium sequences deﬁned
by (13 ). Since the utility function is strictly concave and the set of restrictions is con-
vex, there is a single maximum. The recursive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium,
and therefore, being diﬀerent, must give lower welfare.
The point is clear when we think of the recursive equilibrium as the equilibrium of a
game between successive governments. The recursive equilibrium, imposes as additional
restrictions the optimality of decisions by future governments. More formally,
Proposition 1 Assume that u(c) = log(c). Consider two identical economies with the
same initial conditions, B0(1 + i0) and M0. The full commitment Ramsey equilibrium
gives higher welfare than the no-commitment Recursive equilibrium.
94 Optimal policy with indexed debt and welfare comparison
4.1 Indexed debt
In this section we study the optimal policy when the stock of government debt is indexed.
This is the benchmark against which we compare the optimal policy that obtains when
the stock of government debt is nominal —that is, not indexed— which is the main
focus of this article.
In the economies analyzed in the previous two sections, the real value of the out-






pt = ztct, where zt is predetermined.
In the economy where debt is indexed to the price level, bt is predetermined. The nom-
inal interest rate adjusts to movements in the price level, as to keep the real interest
rate unchanged at β
−1 −1, which is equivalent to zt adjusting to movements in ct, as to
keep bt unchanged.






t=0, an allocation {Mt+1,bt+1,ct,nt}∞
t=0, and a price vector,
{pt,it+1}∞
t=0, such that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed when
nominal liabilities are replaced by real liabilities, according to
Bt(1+it)
pt = bt, where bt is
predetermined.












+ βbt+1 = ct + g + bt, t ≥ 0
This problem is recursive when u(c) = ln(c). In this case, the price elasticity is uni-
tary and, as Nicolini (1998) has shown, the optimal monetary policy is time-consistent.
This problem can be written recursively as follows:
V (b) = max






0 = c + g + b (29)
The ﬁrst order condition for c is:
1
c
− α = −βV
0(b
0) (30)
10That is, the marginal gain of increasing consumption is equated to the marginal cost of











c0 − α (32)





− g − (1 − β)b0. (33)
Notice that expression (31) implies that the real value of the government debt is sta-
tionary and, consequently, that bI = b0.
4.2 Welfare comparisons
As we have seen in Proposition 1, if we compare two economies with identical initial
nominal liabilities, M0 and B0(1 + i0), welfare is higher in the economy with full com-
mitment. In this section we extend this comparison to economies with indexed debt.
Indexed debt can be viewed as an extreme form of commitment. Therefore, we want
to compare the full commitment Ramsey equilibrium allocation in the economy with
nominal debt with the equilibrium allocation that obtains in a comparable economy
when debt is indexed. Notice that in order for this comparison to be meaningful, we
must choose the appropriate initial conditions. To do this, we require that the initial
money holdings, M0, and the real value of the initial debt liabilities in both economies
must be the same. This is not completely straightforward because while the initial real
liabilities, b0, are exogenous in the indexed debt economy, they are endogenous in the
nominal debt economies.
If we start with the nominal economy with full commitment, then the real value




0 . Then, we can make the
following welfare comparison:
Proposition 2 Assume that u(c) = log(c). Consider two economies with initial money
stock M0. One of them has initial nominal debt B0(1 + i0), and the other has initial
indexed debt b0. If b0 =
B0(1+i0)
pF
0 , then the welfare in the economy with indexed debt is
higher than in the economy with nominal debt.
11Proof: In the case with indexed debt we have that consumption is constant over
time cI =
β
α −g −(1 − β)b0. In the case with nominal debt, using the implementability






















[1 + z0] (35)
If b0 = z0cF
0 , then, by Jensen’s inequality, the welfare in the case with indexed debt is
higher than in the case with nominal debt.
In the economy with nominal debt it is optimal to reduce the initial level of consump-
tion because monetizing part of this debt creates no distortions, since there is no time
zero indexation to internalize, and because it reduces the amount of future seigniorage.
By imposing that b0 =
B0(1+i0)
pF
0 , we restrict our attention to the distortion introduced by
the incentive to monetize the nominal debt, and we abstract from the gain introduced
by the reduction in its real value.
In the discussion above we started with a nominal economy with initial condition
z0 and we compared it to an indexed economy with initial condition bF
0 = bF(z0) ≡
z0cF
0 (z0). Alternatively, we can start with an indexed economy with initial condition




F (b0). In this economy, the Ramsey equilibrium has the property that the real
value of the initial debt is
B0(1+i0)
pF
0 = b0. Furthermore, since we consider economies with
the same M0, choosing z0 is equivalent to choosing B0(1 + i0) = z0M0.3
Likewise, we can compare a nominal debt economy with no commitment with an in-
dexed debt economy. In this comparison, if the initial condition of the nominal economy
is z0, then the initial condition of the indexed economy should be bN
0 = bN(z0) ≡ z0C(z0),
where C(z) is the policy function of the recursive monetary equilibrium. Alternatively,
we could start with an indexed economy with initial condition b0 and compare it with




In the following section we compute the equilibrium paths of economies with the
same initial real liabilities b0. In the indexed economy the exogenous initial state is








3In the computations in next section we look at economies where 1 + i0 = u0(cF
0 )/α since this are
economies in which the realized real return in period t = 0 is 1 + r0 = β
−1. This is equivalent to
choosing B0 = z0M0
1+i0 .
125 Numerical solutions
Our model economies are characterized by three parameters: α, β and g. To make them
comparable, we follow the strategy of equating the initial values of real debt, b0. The
economy with indexed debt is computed directly using expression 33. The economy
with nominal debt and full commitment is computed solving a system of two equations
in two unknowns. The equations are (34) and (35) and the unknowns are cF
0 and cF
1 . To
ﬁnd the initial condition zF
0 , we deﬁne bF(z) ≡ zcF
0 (z). This function is invertible and
we use it to obtain zF
0 = b
−1
F (b0). As we have discussed in the previous section, in this
economy, we deﬁne 1 + iF
0 ≡ 1/(αcF
0 ) and we have 1 + iF
1 = 1/(αcF
1 ). By equation (35)








The algorithm that we use to compute the recursive competitive equilibrium is de-
scribed in the Appendix. The output of this algorithm is the policy function C(z) that
we use to deﬁne bN(z) ≡ zC(z). This function is invertible and we use it to obtain the
new initial condition zN
0 = b
−1
N (b0). Since cF
0 (z0) > cN
0 (z0) for any z0, it turns out that
the implied zF
0 < zN
0 . In this economy, 1 + iN
t = 1/(αC(zN
t ) for all t ≥ 0.
The values that we use in our computational exercise to identify the parameters of
the model economies are α = 0.45, β = 0.98, and g = 0.00822. To compute the time
paths we choose the initial condition b0 = 0.17865. Since our period corresponds to a
year, this value of b0 is intentionally chosen to be very high. Speciﬁcally, the value of
the debt to government expenditures ratio is b0/g ' 22. The results that we obtain for
the time paths of real debts, nominal interest rates, and consumption are reported in
Figures 1, 2, and 3.
Figure 1 shows that in the economies with indexed debt is to optimal to keep its
value stationary, and that in the economies with nominal debt it is optimal to reduce
its real value. Under full commitment this reduction is carried out only in the ﬁrst
period, while under no commitment, the real value of debt is depleted progressively
until, asymptotically, it is completely monetized. Recall that in these economies the
time paths of real debt are given by bF
t = zF
t cF




We also ﬁnd that the long-run nominal interest rate that obtains when debt is indexed
is higher than the nominal interest rates that obtain when debt is nominal. Moreover,
the long-run interest rate under full commitment is higher than the one that obtains
than under no commitment (see Figure 2). Notice that in the three economies the
nominal interest rates in period t = 0 satisfy the condition 1 + i0 = 1/(αc0).
Finally, Figure 3 compares the optimal consumption paths. Using these paths and
the corresponding optimal labor paths we compute the utility value of the optimal
equilibrium paths. We ﬁnd that this value is highest in the economy with indexed
debt and that it is smallest in the economy with nominal debt and no commitment.
Speciﬁcally, in the economy with nominal debt and full commitment the value of the
optimal path is 0.012 percent smaller than in the economy with indexed debt, and in
the economy with nominal debt and no commitment the value of the optimal path is
130.133 percent smaller.
6 Additional taxes
In most advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source of revenue, and government
liabilities are ﬁnanced mostly with consumption and income taxes. In this section we
show two basic results, regarding the introduction of taxes in our economy. First, we
show that the introduction of taxes, while it will reduce the need to raise revenues
through seigniorage, may not change the characterization of equilibria with respect to
the economies with monetary policy only, analyzed in the previous sections. This is the
case if the ﬁscal authority simply sets taxes one period in advance and, subsequently, the
monetary authority sets its policy. This adds realism to the analysis of the interaction
of ﬁscal and monetary policies. Second, we show that, in contrast, if there is full
commitment on the part of the ﬁscal authority that makes its policy choices in the
initial period, before the monetary authority does, then the full commitment outcome
can be achieved even if there is no commitment on the part of the monetary authority.
We show that it is part of such policy to ﬁnance all the outstanding government liabilities
with the consumption tax, and to constrain the monetary authority to implement a zero
nominal interest rate.
We show these results introducing consumption taxes, {τt}∞
t=0. The analysis easily
generalizes to the introduction of other taxes. However, it is not our intention to provide
a complete characterization of all possible ﬁscal instruments, neither to consider all
diﬀerent games that ﬁscal and monetary authorities can play.
6.1 The model economy with consumption taxes





t [u(ct) − αnt] (36)
subject to:
pt(1 + τt)ct ≤ Mt (37)












= (1 + it+1)(1 + τt+1) (40)









These conditions must hold for every t ≥ 0. Notice that expression (40) reﬂects the
fact that the household makes its plans based on its expectations about both interest
rates and taxes. The intertemporal condition (41) is exactly the same as expression (40)
and the cash-in-advance constraint (42) now includes consumption taxes.










and the feasibility conditions (4) do not change.





+ zt+1ct+1β(1 + τt+1) = ztct(1 + τt) + ct + g (44)








+ βzT+1cT+1(1 + τT+1)) = 0 (45)
6.2 Optimal monetary policy when the ﬁscal authority moves one period
in advance
We now consider the case where tax decisions for some period t must be made one period
in advance, and may depend only on the state at t − 1. In this case we can deﬁne the
new state variable b zt ≡ zt(1 + τt), and the problems are isomorphic to the problems in





+ b zt+1ct+1β = b ztct + ct + g (46)
15which is formally identical to (11).
There is an additional restriction that the nominal interest rate must be nonnegative.
This constraint was satisﬁed when seigniorage was the only source of revenue, but it is
not necessarily satisﬁed in this case.
We can model the interaction between the monetary and the ﬁscal authority in two
ways. One way is to assume that they decide jointly as a single authority. In this
case the analysis goes through as before and we obtain the same results in terms of
allocations. The alternative is to assume some given strategy for taxes as a function
of the state. As long the nominal interest rates are away from the lower bound of zero
nominal interest rates, the problem for the monetary authority has the same structure
as before, and therefore the same results go through, even if part of the government
liabilities are ﬁnanced with taxes.
In summary, the monetary authority faces the same problem with consumption taxes
than the one faced when there was only seigniorage, for any degree of monetary commit-
ment. Therefore, the allocations that obtain for the various types of debt and monetary
policy commitment technologies are exactly the same as those that obtained before.
This result is established in the following subsections:
Consumption taxes, nominal debt and full commitment to monetary policy.











[1 + z0 (1 + τ0)] (47)
ct+1 = c
F
1 , for t ≥ 1. (48)
where τ0 is predetermined.
Consumption taxes, nominal debt and no commitment to monetary policy.















M0 (1 + τ0)
 [1 + c(b z
0)]
−1 (49)
It follows that in the economy with nominal debt and no commitment to monetary
policy, the path of depletion of the stock of debt in real terms coincides with the one
characterized in Section 3.2 and computed in Section 5.
16Consumption taxes and indexed debt. In this case policies are stationary and we
obtain the stationary equilibrium allocation cI =
β
α−g−(1 − β)b b0 whereb b0 = b0 (1 + τ0).
6.3 Optimal ﬁscal policy with commitment
In the three regimes discussed in the previous section exactly how the equilibrium alloca-
tions are supported is not determined since the household only cares about the eﬀective
nominal rate of return, (1 + i)(1 + τ). For instance, it is always possible to set taxes
in a way that the resulting monetary policy follows the Friedman rule of zero nominal
interest rates, even though in our economy there is no eﬃciency gain from following
such a rule.4
To see this, suppose that the stock of debt is nominal and that there is full commit-
ment to ﬁscal policy. Let the ﬁscal authority set, for t ≥ 0,τt+1 = τ(b zt) = τ(b z0), where
τ(b z0) corresponds to the tax rate that fully ﬁnances the government liabilities in the
allocation that obtains with full commitment, from period one on. That is,




If, at any t > 0, the monetary authority tries to monetize part of the existing stock of
nominal debt and to use the resulting revenues to increase future consumption —say,
maintaining a constant c from then on— then, it must be the case that ct < cF < c.
Given that




and that (50) must be satisﬁed, the interest rate would have to be negative, i < 0. Neg-
ative interest rates can not be an equilibrium in this economy since then the household
would like to borrow unboundedly. Therefore, given that it is not possible to raise future
consumption with negative taxes, there is no gain in partially monetizing the stock of
nominal debt in period zero. In this case monetary policy is time consistent. There-
fore if there is no commitment to monetary policy, a fully committed ﬁscal authority
that wants to maximize expression (2), will set τt+1 = τ(b z0), t ≥ 0.5 The following
proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 3 Assume that ﬁscal authorities maximize the welfare of the representative
household and can fully commit to their policies. Then the equilibrium allocation is
4This may not be true in a more general model economy. For instance, this is not true if we in-
troduce a distinction between cash and credit goods. In this case, the Friedman rule would eliminate
the distortion between cash and credit goods created by the cash-in-advance constraint. This notwith-
standing, the distortions introduced by the presence of a positive stock of nominal debt would still be
there, just as in the economy with only cash goods.
5Marimon, Nicolini, and Teles (2003) make a similar argument.
17the optimal equilibrium allocation that obtains when there is a single Ramsey planner,
regardless of the degree of commitment of the monetary authority.
7 Concluding comments
This paper discusses the diﬀerent ways in which nominal and indexed debt aﬀect the
sequential choice of optimal monetary and debt policies. To this purpose, we study a
general equilibrium monetary model where the costs of an unanticipated inﬂation arise
from a cash-in-advance constraint with the timing as in Svensson (1985), and where
government expenditures are exogenous. In our environment, as in Nicolini (1998),
when the utility function is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure and debt
is indexed, there is no time-inconsistency problem. In this case, the optimal monetary
policy is to maintain the initial level of indexed debt, independently of the level of
commitment of a Ramsey government.
In contrast, for the same speciﬁcation of preferences, when the initial stock of govern-
ment debt is nominally denominated, a time inconsistency problem arises. In this case,
the government is tempted to inﬂate away its nominal debt liabilities. When the gov-
ernment cannot commit to its planned policies, the optimal sequential policy consists
in progressively depleting the outstanding stock of debt, so that it converges asymp-
totically to zero. Optimal nominal interest rates in this case are also decreasing and
converge asymptotically. Hence, the optimal monetary policy in this economy coincides
in the long term with the one that obtains in an economy which has no outstanding
debt, and from which these time-inconsistency distortions are obviously absent.
Such equilibrium path is not chosen when the initial stock of government debt is
nominally denominated and the government can fully commit to its planned policies.
In this case, it is optimal to increase the inﬂation tax in the ﬁrst period, and to keep a
lower and constant inﬂation tax for the rest of the future.
In the rational expectations equilibria of our economies there are no surprise inﬂa-
tions. Still, for a given initial real value of outstanding debt, the most eﬃcient equi-
librium is the one that obtains when debt is indexed, the equilibrium with nominal
debt and full commitment comes second, and the equilibrium with nominal debt and
no commitment is the least eﬃcient. This result highlights the sense in which nominal
debt is indeed a burden on optimal monetary policy.
It should be noted that the source of the ineﬃciencies and of the monetary policy
distortions discussed in this paper is not the desire to run a soft budgetary policy that
increases the debt liabilities of the government. Every policy discussed in this article is
an optimal policy, subject to the appropriate institutional and commitment constraints,
and it is implemented by a benevolent and far-sighted government who does not face
either uncertainty or the need for public investment, and who would, therefore, prefer to
reduce debt liabilities. The source of the ineﬃciencies is the distortion created by the lack
of commitment that results from the mere existence of an outstanding stock of nominal
18debt. Therefore, our results highlight the need to implement policy and institutional
arrangements that either guarantee high commitment levels, or that reduce the allowed
levels of nominal debt. This notwithstanding, our results also show that a constraint on
deﬁcits may be ineﬀective to reduce the distortions created by nominal debt since they
are independent of the size of the deﬁcits.
The introduction of additional forms of taxation further clariﬁes the interplay be-
tween the various forms of debt and commitment possibilities. Under the natural as-
sumption that ﬁscal policy choices are predetermined, we show that the optimal pol-
icy problem has the same characterization, provided that the revenues levied through
seigniorage are enough to allow for an optimal monetary policy with non-negative inter-
est rates. Instead, as in Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (2003), if there is full commitment
to an optimal ﬁscal policy, the ﬁscal authorities, anticipating monetary policy distor-
tions, choose to fully ﬁnance government liabilities, and the resulting monetary policy
is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates. Moreover, this policy results in the
equilibrium that obtains in the economy with full commitment.
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Appendix: Computation
To compute the recursive monetary equilibrium deﬁned in Section 3.2, we solve the
following dynamic program:





− g + βz
0C(z
0) = c(1 + z) (53)
To solve this problem, we use the following algorithm:
• Step 1: Deﬁne a discrete grid on z
• Step 2: Deﬁne a decreasing discrete function ¯ C(z)
• Step 3: Iterate on the Bellman operator described in equation (52) until we ﬁnd
the converged V ∗(z), Z0∗(z),C∗(z)
• Step 4: If C∗(z) = ¯ C(z), we are done. Else, let ¯ C(z) = C∗(z) and go to Step 3.
20Figure 1: The optimal stocks of indexed debt and of nominal debt with full commitment













21Figure 2: The optimal paths of nominal interest rates with indexed debt and with













22Figure 3: The optimal paths of consumption with indexed debt and with nominal debt
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